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Propaganda warfare in Mexican Radio during Second World War
José Luis Ortiz Garza (Ph.D)

 (This is a translation by Theodore Wills from the Chapter 6 of the book «Mexico en guerra», by José Luis Ortiz Garza, Editorial Planeta, México, 1989. The bibliographic references marked within the parentheses -which are present in the book- are not included here. Since some of the quotations were translated by Theodore Wills directly from the book in Spanish, which in turn were translated by the author from the English, there may be slight differences when compared to the original versions. The idea, however is well covered)

6.1 From distant neighbors to instant neighbors

Radio was undoubtedly the most important means of information in the Second World War. It was able to overcome geographical barriers as well as the lack of rapid transportation which stymied the distribution of print media. The most remote corners of the Mexican sierras could tune into station XEW and other stations from Mexico City. At the time there were over three hundred thousand receivers in the country.(1) 

Radio had become the ideal vehicle for fast, cheap and systematic mass persuasion over a poorly educated populace that relied on its feelings more than its thoughts. From October, 1937, the U.S. government had been watching with alarm the steady growth of German radio programming in Latin America. The transmissions were so powerful that they oftentimes blocked out or interfered with North American transmissions. Little by little, the U.S. was getting eased off the radio dial.(2)

 In February, 1938, President Roosevelt convened a private session with representatives from the largest U.S. radio companies at the White House. The discussion had to do with alternative solutions to the German radio threat. One option was for the U.S. government to put up its own radio network alongside of the private chains. The businessmen in attendance resisted this intrusion by the state into their commercial domain. They made an argument that although short-wave radio was not a money-maker, if the U.S. government would revise the appropriate law, they would take on the consequent expense. Frank Mason, vice-president of the NBC Network, detailed their presence in Latin America as including seven hours a week of news in Spanish and Portuguese. NBC had 1,800 employees producing 54,531 programs or 19,842 hours of broadcasting time for the region. The other representatives made similar estimations. What they did not emphasize was the fact that a great percentage of their short-wave programs were also going out on commercial band.(3) 

The radio leaders agreed that the German influence on radio was increasing, but they did not see it as a serious threat to U.S. interests. The German programs were solely for promoting tourism. The networks concluded that the U.S. government would be best advised not to establish a short-wave station because it would be like copying "the tactics of the dictatorial countries wherein radio is an instrument of government power designed for the service of the ruling elite." These arguments appear to have convinced Roosevelt to channel his propaganda forces for short wave by means of privately-held stations. As a result, in the spring of 1939, the legislation governing the radio industry was modified so as to encourage advertising on short wave in Latin America. In return, the U.S. government had the radio networks increase the power of their transmissions and direct more antennaes southward. The U.S. propaganda machine was beginning to gear up for action.(4) 

Short-wave radio made distant and distinct neighbors into instant neighbors. Propaganda began to say in the very way it communicated that cross-cultural differences were easily surmountable. "Panamericanismo" had "Hispanoamericanismo" on the run. The difficulties of enlisting short-wave radio into government service were crowned by the challenge of a politically apathetic listening audience. From the very start of the war, the French propagandists had employed all their persuasive powers on the "Paris-Mondial" short-wave radio network. They were quickly disillusioned. A diplomatic report from 1940 stated that the Mexican listener was primarily interested in stations XEW, XEQ and XEB, while paying little attention to short-wave programming.(5) 

North American audience surveys had revealed that even though many Latin Americans could receive short-wave broadcasts, most preferred to listen to local programming. The Germans had previously taken note of this phenomenon. They decided to tape their short-wave broadcasts, then purchase local air-time for later re-broadcast on popular stations. Local sponsors could cut down the costs involved by means of advertising. All of this allowed for access to a broader segment of the radio public. Without giving up on the short-wave audience, the propagandists opened up a "second front" on local station listeners. The Mexico City station XEN had one thousand watts of power and was completely under the power of the German press office, according to the French legation in Mexico. It continually broadcast news and commentaries which were unfavorable to the Allied cause. As if to add insult to injury, these reports were usually accompanied by French music, such as the singing of La Madelon. The French had total power over station XEB, whose owners were of French background. According to Izthak Bar-Lewaw, other stations at the service of the Germans until mid-1940 were XERC in the capital and XEHV and XEU in Veracruz.(6) 

The North Americans copied the German strategy of duplicating the broadcast value of short-wave transmissions. They eventually took this system to its ultimate consequences. NBC and CBS both set up a vast network of Latin American affiliates who were charged with rebroadcasting the most important short-wave programs. 

6.2 Let loose the war of ether!

It was 3:15 a.m. on September 1, 1939, when the dormant teletypes came to life in the principal Mexican newspapers. The Germans had invaded Poland at a lightning pace. The news was shouted on every corner. The Second World War had begun! The news sped around the world in a flash. While Mexican stations were hooked up for the fifth State of the Union address of President Cardenas, short-wave listeners could receive the latest information directly from Europe via NBC and CBS correspondents. At the end of the presidential address, it seemed as if radio had assumed the seat of honor in Mexican homes. Following upon the North American model, programs would be interrupted for important news announcements.(7)

Radio had arrived. It was now about to begin some of the most brilliant chapters in communications history. It was no longer a luxury to reach out to the most remote counties by means of short-wave. The dramatic onset of world war proved an unbeatable justification for the extension of this media. None of the great international radio networks were prepared for a sudden event of such enormous consequences. Demand for information exceeded the supply/service capacity. Two years were to pass before this demand was satisfied, thanks in part to the work of propagandists. Using what scarce news that was available, XEW met the news demand as best they could. It must be said that did a better job than any other station in Mexico and all of Latin America. The "Voice of Latin America from Mexico" produced on September 1, 1939, a news program of such breadth that it is of historic magnitude. XEW had an information marathon which ran throughout the day and into the early hours of the night, keeping listeners abreast of events in Europe. The station secured an excellent reception of the BBC from London which was covering Parliamentary debate about entering the war. The anxious voice of the announcer was testimony enough of the drama unfolding. Nevertheless, a translation into Spanish was ready within two minutes time. Manuel Bernal and other announcers from the "W" took great pains to communicate in great detail the diverse aspects of the conflict, be they geographical, logistical, etc. One heard the opinions of Roosevelt, Chamberlain, the Queen of the Netherlands, King Leopold of Belgium, along with journalists reporting from Japan, French Indochina, etc. This was truly incredible! Daniel Morales remembered the day in these words: «Never had a radio station brought its audience so close to the very heartbeat of a major world event. With its long arm of ether able to wrap around the entire world, radio transported Mexico into a higher level of consciousness, the power to know the tremendous tragedy up to its most minute details.» (8)

Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, Reich, Panzers, Blitzkrieg, Spitfire, Stuka, Fuhrer, Stalin, Roosevelt, Chamberlain, Daladier, Danzig, Warsaw...All of these names, terms and places had to be understood, explained, read, written about, put into context. On that first day of September, Mexico went out into the world to get a handle on war news. Few would have suspected that plans were already afoot to bring the war to Mexico. This was a war that respected no boundaries nor age-old conventions. This was the propaganda war. For the time being, one had to be ready for anything. What better way to follow the conflict than by radio from the comfort of one's home? Businesses took advantage of September to make their August. The outbreak of war coincided with an outbreak of ads for radios. It was 1939, but the 1940 models were now available! They had from five to sixteen bulbs and some were adaptable for television! (9) 

Home demonstrations were offered without prior commitment. Even ones old radio could be traded in as part of the purchase. The important thing was to be able to follow the war's progress almost minute by minute, since there was "nothing more interesting that could be received in a radio ... than the daily bulletins which the war powers send out, many times from the very fields of battle."(10) 

Never in the history of the world has the family had in its own home the miraculous power to listen clearly to voices of people who are many thousands of kilometers away from us.(11) 

Never had information coming from the exterior received such a forceful promotion and popular demand. Disguised by the cloak of information, foreign ideology would penetrate the country with a privileged visa to perform important political functions. All it took was a simple turn of the dial to open the home to the forces of propaganda. 

6.3 The magnetic spider spins its web

On November 8, 1940, William Paley, president of CBS, began a tour of Latin America with the idea of attracting to his network a large number of affiliate stations. Paley was one of the most important men in the United States at the time. He had just met with President Roosevelt to discuss his business trip. Roosevelt had first offered Paley the Coordinator's job at OCIAA. Paley turned down the offer and recommended Rockefeller for the post since Rockefeller spoke Spanish, had business interests in the region and was generally very interested in its development.(12) Upon his return from Latin America, Paley had signed 64 of the most important radio stations there as CBS affiliates.(13) The terms of the contract were that the station would broadcast a minimum of one hour of CBS programming each day and that the contract was in force for five years. Paley emphasized the value of this transmitting time, this "penetration," which the United States would have in these countries. According to Paley, "This will give us a dominant position ... in comparison with any other nation. The Germans, of course, have been buying time on the radio but we still have the upper hand as a result of these contracts."(14) 

In July, 1941, John Royal, vice-president of the NBC network, made a trip to Latin America with the same objective as Paley and even better results. Among other things, Royal signed on station XEW, the most important station in the region. XEW also had the national network with the most listeners.(15) The entry of the United States into the war made short-wave radio efforts a high priority. North American radio networks found transmissions to Latin America to be a financial burden. In much the same way that it had handled the printed media, the U.S. government granted radio advertisers a tax deduction from the summer of 1942. In return, short-wave transmissions began to go for 24 hours a day. The time devoted to news coverage increased in some cases by 400%.(16) 

The stations owned by Emilio Azcarraga affiliated with both CBS and NBC. For example, XEQ, tied to CBS, was part of the "Chain of the Americas." In March of 1943, it headed up eighteen stations in the provinces. XEW and its twenty-one affiliates in Mexico were part of the "Panamerican Chain" of NBC. In addition, the Mexican stations maintained interchanges with 42 sister stations in Central and South America.(17) 

It is of note that in February of 1943, XEQ hired a North American by the name of Daniel Lundberg to be Assistant Manager of the station. Lundberg had previously worked for the CBS network.(18) 

Unable to sign up with either of the radio giants, XEOY went with the Mutual Broadcasting System(MBS) in June, 1942. XEOY was the thirteenth most powerful radio station in the region, though its coverage was only national. MBS agreed to work with XEOY on the condition that it expand transmissions to the wider Latin American audience.(19) 

The alignment of the Azcarraga stations with the most powerful radio networks in the world would have enormous consequences for the Azcarraga fortunes, as well as the "Golden Era" of radio in Mexico. Nevertheless, there were unforeseen problems. In the first months of 1942, few would have questioned the acumen of the Mexican magnate, yet fewer still would have been able to forecast his difficulties with the U.S. government. 

6.4 XEW on the black list

When the OCIAA decided to put in force the "black lists," it surveyed the opinion of many North American exporters who operated in Latin America. In many cases, the criteria for denouncing possible enemies to the United States was not that clear. Accusations would surface simply because an institution had not been enthusiastic enough towards the U.S. or because a company was more of a commercial enemy. No one who knew the biography of Emilio Azcarraga in 1940 could seriously contemplate that he was anti-North American. Nevertheless, between the end of 1941 and the middle of 1942, the FBI and the U.S. State Department were seriously wondering about Azcarraga and the loyalties of his stations. Based on reports from secret agents, the U.S. officials believed that Azcarraga and his stations were pro-Nazi and anti-U.S.(20) 

On April 5, 1941, the U.S. military attache in Mexico informed the State Department about German activities in Mexico. Hundreds of similar reports had been sent to Washington in the previous months but this list included something special: station XEW and its manager, Othon Velez. This report was based on information from an anti-Nazi German who in previous occasions had provided reliable data to U.S. intelligence. It was claimed that the station sent secret messages in code to be taped and deciphered in Berlin. The secret signals were allegedly inserted between musical numbers or commercials. The key to the code was to be found in the first, second, or some other letter of each word in the message. The presumed organizer of the scheme was Othon Velez, who was a well-known supporter of the German cause. According to the U.S. report, Velez had a powerful radio receiver in his house where messages from Berlin could be received and taped for the German legation in Mexico City.(21) 

In September, 1941, the "Coordinating Committee" in Mexico had been studying the possibility of how to make a big increase in U.S. radio programming. The decision involved a great deal of money, so before making it, the OCIAA convened twenty of the top U.S. businessmen in Mexico. The selected station had to be sympathetic to the democratic cause. Many of the men at the table knew Emilio Azcarraga and his sympathies. They voted XEW as the best vehicle for U.S. programming "without any doubt expressed by anyone present, on the contrary, the majority of the members spoke strongly in favor of Azcarraga and expressed their belief that he was pro-North American."(22) 

Despite these words of support, U.S. intelligence insisted that Azcarraga was continuing his subversive actvities at stations XEW and XEQ: «Azcarraga is a Mexican with strong anti-North American sentiments and pro-Nazi sympathies. At this time he is pressuring the Associated Press and the United Press to get exclusive rights for transmission of North American news while using the services of Transocean for free... There are reliable reports that Azcarraga receives approximately 20,000 pesos a month for North American advertising from both stations».(23) 

It was said that Azcarraga was aware that he was being watched and that he had cut back his activities. The accusation was renewed about Velez and a list of pro-Nazi employees of XEW was made including the Assistant Manager, the Artistic Director, the Technical Supervisor and many members of the technical crew. U.S. intelligence reported that the majority of the management and staff of XEQ were also pro-Nazi.(24) 

Much of the preceeding information had been supplied by H. J. Corson, a North American spy whose official job was representative of the American Association of Advertising Agencies.(25) He also worked as an "observer" for the "Oficina de Informacion para la Exportacion." Corson had been reporting since May of 1941 of the supposed pro-German and falangist tendencies of XEW. He claimed that within the commercial houses of the French and the British these attitudes were well-known. He reported that the Secretary of Communications had informed Azcarraga that members of his staff were "personas non gratas" who should be fired. For its part, the Allied Committee for Publicity, a Franco-British creation, also considered Emilio Azcarraga to be pro-Nazi.(26) The U.S. Department of State and the OCIAA considered this to be a controversy of the highest magnitude. Just the media power of Emilio Azcarraga would merit this consideration. But only in August, 1941, his stations had been joined with the "Panamerican Chain" to transmit U.S. programming. "Broadcasting" magazine had heralded the contract, calling XEW "the most powerful station in the Western Hemisphere."(27) Along the same lines, in August, 1940, "Time" magazine observed that while the most powerful stations in the U.S. were limited to 50,000 watts, XEW operated with 100,000 watts and had the authorization to go to 200,000 watts.(28) 

The superb management of the business had earned it an "Administrative Excellence" award from the magazine "Variety" in 1940. Given the magnitude of the interests involved, XEW and its staff were not publicly included in the "black lists." The bureaucratic traffic intensified. In December, 1941, people at the State Department began to complain that the Azcarraga investigation was becoming interminable. They suggested that the question be resolved by the embassy staff in Mexico, since they were closest to the facts. They also feared angering Azcarraga, a man who had enormous influence in the Mexican government. The chief of the OCIAA's Radio Division, Donald Francisco, suggested handling the matter discreetly. If necessary, XEW could be controlled by commercial pressures via the A.P., the U.P. and the NBC and CBS stations.(30) 

Having taken the matter into its own hands, the U.S. embassy in Mexico completely exonerated Emilio Azcarraga. Azcarraga had already cancelled all advertising from products included on the "black lists." He was even publicly ridiculed for serving as "advisor for radio at the U.S. embassy."(31) In a summary report sent in July, 1942, the U.S. embassy concluded that after a thorough investigation including interviews with figures in business and government, no evidence whatsoever had been unearthed to substantiate the charges that Azcarraga was pro-Nazi. Among the testimonies, there was one from John Royal, vice-president of NBC, who declared that he had known Azcarraga for ten years and that "I can't imagine anything more absurd than the accusation that Azcarraga was anti-American or pro-German."(32) 

For these reasons the embassy urged the State Department to close the investigation forthwith and to withdraw certain sanctions which had already gone into effect, such as delays in supplying bulbs and financing. The embassy summed up its case as follows: «The chain of radio stations controlled by Emilio Azcarraga is by far the most broad-based and powerful means of mass communication which now exists in Mexico. An unfavorable treatment towards this chain or its members would cause incredible harm to our cause. The embassy cannot employ stronger terms to urge that all the archives in Washington be corrected as soon as possible». ...(33) Although it would seem that the embassy's strong words had an effect, the State Department continued to follow very closely everything having to do with XEW. A sophisticated electronic listening post was established in the U.S. embassy to monitor the content of all radio programs in Mexico. 

6.5 The walls have ears

From the middle of 1941, the North Americans were aware of the presence of secret Nazi transmitters operating in Mexico. Transmissions were made from concealed sites...somewhere between Laredo and Monterrey; in the area of Navojoa, Sonora; at a location near Chihuahua; near Taxco. ... Like electronic hunting dogs, several North American automobiles equipped with the latest in listening devices were granted permission to enter Mexico, but they came up empty-handed. To avoid further delays resulting from immigration, a team of Mexican technicians were trained to use the new equipment in Washington. In exchange, the Mexican government allowed for a radio installation to be built in the Yucatan which would repeat transmissions emanating from the United States.(34) 

In February, 1943, the OCIAA Radio Section in Mexico presented the plan it was following to control radio transmissions in the country. In this instance, the office was dealing solely with commercial stations, as opposed to secret or subversive stations. Thanks to funds authorized by the "Coordinating Committee" and the Ambassador, the office had begun to monitor all radio programs in Mexico. With the help of a loan the office had obtained an enormous machine to do this work, the same kind used in the installations of Pan American Airways. This receiver and another one on the way would be permanently located at the embassy. The office takes note of the need for trained personnel and a stenographer. The stenographer would write out commentaries made on short-wave radio from the U.S. which would be made available to Mexican announcers. If the North American commentators were sending along secret messages within the news package, in Mexico it would be known what aspects of the communication required special emphasis. The same receiver was used to measure the power and fidelity of radio signals coming to Mexico from the United States.(35)

There is no reason to doubt that the U.S. government went ahead with its plans to monitor Mexican radio. With regard to station XEW, there are some indications that the U.S. paid close attention to its programming content.(36) 

6.6 Mega-dose of drama 

Various war-related radio dramas were produced by the OCIAA Radio Division and transmitted through the NBC and CBS chains to Latin America. The shows had a tremendous impact due to their professional quality and the time they were aired. The program content had been the object of careful study. At the beginnings of March, 1942, OCIAA headquarters asked its Mexico office for copies of the magazines "Orbe," "Abside" and "Asi," along with others which could be used for radio scripts.(37) The shows were broadcast in Spanish on short-wave to all the stations affiliated with CBS and NBC. Subsequently, the shows were sent in recorded form to the U.S. affiliates for re-broadcasting. In Mexico, Radio Programas de Mexico organized this work with the chains led by XEW and XEQ. In May of 1943, XEW re-broadcast the following shows from NBC:(38) Mondays: "Contraespionaje" (14:00 to 14:30) Fridays: "La Marcha del Tiempo" (20:15 to 20:45) Saturdays: "Epopeya del Nuevo Mundo" (20:40 to 21:10) Sundays: "Radioteatro de America" (21:20 to 21:50) For its part, XEQ re-broadcast these CBS offerings: Tuesdays: "Las Ideas no se Matan" (21:45 to 22:15) Wednesdays: "La Marca del Jaguar" (19:30 to 20:00) Fridays: "Estamos en Guerra" (21:45 to 22:15) Saturdays: "Hit Parade" (21:30 to 22:15) Sundays: "Hacia un Mundo Mejor" (19:30 to 20:00) The themes of the shows can be summarized as follows:(39) 

-'Estamos en Guerra': A dramatic presentation of the most noteworthy events of the week. Special propaganda emphasis is put on the news which opens the program. -'Epopeya del Nuevo Mundo': A dramatization of the heroic efforts made by citizens of the United States in the fight for liberty. The pompous title was easily confused in Mexico with the very popular cartoon character, 'Popeye.' -'Radioteatro de America': Radio-dramas which portrayed the steely determination of the United Nations to win out over the Axis Powers. The show contrasted democratic and totalitarian principles. -'Espiritu de Victoria': Adaptation of a British series entitled, 'The 22nd Letter: 'V' for Victory.' Dealt with work of the Underground in occupied Europe. It emphasized the dramatic and presented a story from a different occupied country each week. -'Las Ideas no se Matan': The central theme was the lack of intellectual freedom and freedom of speech in Axis countries. One topic was the government use of censure to outlaw famous authors like Stefan Zweig. -'La Marcha del Tiempo': Dramatic presentation of news of the week appearing in Time magazine. This was one of the most successful shows in the United States and Mexico. The producers of 'La Marcha del Tiempo' opened up new horizons for radio. The techniques used from the program's start such as soliloquies, stream of consciousness, imitations of famous voices, musical accompaniment to news, etc., did cause some controversy about the integrity of the news content. Yet no one questioned the show's enormous penetration and impact. In the middle of 1943, the show changed its title to 'La Historia en Accion.'(40) 

-'Hit Parade': Presentation of the most popular songs in the United States at that moment. This show was so poorly received in Mexico that sponsors could only conclude that Mexicans preferred their own music over that of the United States. There were other shows both dramatic and musical which were later shown in Latin America and Mexico. "El Misterioso" was one of the most popular. The program advertising by the OCIAA Radio Division is revealing: «'El Misterioso': Based on authentic information of pro-Axis activities. The story focused on a typical Latin American who has a sincere affection for the United States and the United Nations. ...This is an extraordinary means to teach the masses what the real significance of pro-Axis activity is for their own independence, economic well-being and national sovereignty.»(41) 

Although they had much less penetration than the North Americans, the British were the #2 country in terms of radio broadcasting in Mexico. At the end of August, 1943, they announced the following 20:15 shows to be aired on the Continental Radio Network:(42) Tuesday: Aeronautical magazine of the month Wednesday: Weekly digest of war developments, as narrated by Salvador Madariaga. Thursday: Puesto de escucha Friday: International Politics Saturday: Inside Great Britain Sunday: Converation time Monday: Commentary by Atalaya 

6.7 A prophetic document 

The differences in resources and preparation between North Americans and Latin Americans in radio were astounding. The OCIAA staffed its Radio Department with well-trained and highly experienced professionals. The OCIAA did saw its mission as something greater than producing one successful show after another, each one with its propaganda lining. The North Americans provided direct and indirect assistance to radio businesses in Latin America. The actual structure of radio in the region had its origins in the labors of the OCIAA. The leaders of OCIAA's Radio Department attributed the success of their efforts in Latin America to their capacity to improve and modernize the medium, according to Fejes. This analysis is well expressed in a revealing, 1941 memorandum proposing increased subsidies for the NBC and CBS chains in Latin America. This additional funding would consolidate the OCIAA presence in the region and build up larger audiences. The document anticipates the future in a truly prophetic manner: «We are going to find ourselves revolutionizing the image of radio in Latin America for a cost of more or less one million dollars. We will take to these countries the same benefits we have enjoyed from our own radio networks. We will create the habit of listening while at the same time creating the philosophy of movie stars. We will make radio more desirable not only for its quality programming, but for its more passionate programming, with more variety and more color. We will make radio easier and more popular to buy. In this way, we will educate, influence and inform the peoples of the various republics».(43)

In the middle of 1942, when there was still much ground to be covered in this campaign, an article in La Nacion took note of this influence: «Our beloved neighbors to the North, masters in the science of propaganda, have for some time been producing news programs in Spanish, Portuguese and French throughout Latin America. The "Coordinating Committee," watched over by the super-active Nelson Rockefeller, has addressed radio with the importance it deserves. In the midst of its pro democratic work, the Committee has been building up the Mexican news shows which we so often listen to».(44) 

6.8 Radio Programas de Mexico

At the start of the Forties, radio stations based in Mexico City, like XEW, did not really cover all of the country, despite their powerful antennaes. There were corners of Mexico which remained apart from modern communications. Others, like Guadalajara, were ever at the mercy of the wind or other atmospheric factors which would cause a weak or discontinuous reception.(45) 

Naturally, advertisers were not eager to sponsor "nationally broadcast" shows which could not guarantee national audiences. With the exception of the "National Hour" and a few other special events related to the Presidency, Mexico had practically no experience of nationwide, simultaneous transmissions. Because the operation required that long distance telephone lines be kept open, it involved a significant expense that few happenings could justify. There was no permanent system of transmissions on a national chain. XEW was the indisputed leader in the field. It had a system of putting shows on records which were then distributed to stations in the provinces. This was the most economical fashion for Azcarraga to give provincial listeners the best of his constellation of artists, announcers and other professionals.(46) This system was institutionalized with the founding of Radio Programas de Mexico(RPM) on May 31,1941. The president of RPM was Emilio Azcarraga. The vice-president was Clemente Serna Martinez.(47) 

Besides distributing information and entertainment to affiliate stations, RPM also became an advertising agency specializing in provincial markets.(48) The chain set up by RPM acted like a catalyst for the many, many social, political and commercial changes about to transform Mexico. Business and politics could not operate upon a national stage. Products which became known and demanded by the public would have to be delivered to far-off localities. The names of the great figures of history and politics were becoming better known than the names of local political bosses. The distances in Mexico were becoming smaller. This enormous and fragmented country was going the way of the global village. North American propagandists thought Radio Programas de Mexico to be the perfect vehicle for its ideological bombardments. No other nation in Latin America had a radio network comparable to Mexico. For example, while Mexico had 29 stations tied to NBC, Brazil, the country closest to Mexico, had 12 stations. Argentina only had seven affiliates.(49) 

In 1943, it was estimated that the RPM network covered an audience of 2,405,000 persons in the sixteen most important cities of Mexico.(50) In February of 1943, RPM charged the "Coordinating Committee" in Mexico 4,343.60 pesos for the broadcast of eight series produced by CBS and NBC. When at this time XEW staff offered to the OCIAA the possibility of direct and simultaneous transmissions by means of telephone, the North Americans compared costs and opted for the existing arrangement.(51) During about three years the interests of RPM and those of the OCIAA in Mexico were in perfect harmony. The businesses of Emilio Azcarraga and Clemente Serna Martinez were being consolidated because their programs were sponsored by North American businesses like Pond's, Standard Brands, Parker Pens, Coca-Cola, Philco, etc. 

By 1945, RPM had achieved a measure of power far beyond the expectations of the OCIAA staff following its progress. The first reaction was one of awe and amazement at the way the RPM network had come to dominate first Mexico and then parts of other countries in Central and South America.(52) But the look of awe soon degenerated into the look of jealousy. Mexican business did not have the right to challenge the ideological and commercial hegemony of the United States in the New World. Memories of the Monroe Doctrine. The growing fears about this network going hemispheric are apparent in this letter by the OCIAA's Director of Information in Mexico City to Nelson Rockefeller: «If this growth should come to pass, when the time comes for OCIAA to discontinue its support for programs of NBC and CBS, these two networks will be left out of the Latin American market by the all powerful Radio Programas.» Taken on their commercial merit, there are not many reasons for NBC and CBS to produce these programs. But the distribution of these programs has led to the establishment of a prominent chain in Latin America and it would be a pity if that chain were to be owned by Mexicans instead of North Americans... The letter suggests that Nelson Rockefeller pass along this information to the North American radio networks. The state of affairs could be partly blamed on the North Americans for their having done such a good job: «You will recall in our previous conversations and correspondence that we have always thought that the best programming in Spanish would better be produced in Mexico rather than New York. Apparently, the U.S. networks were of the same opinion because all of their programs for Latin America are being produced in Mexico by Mexican writers, Mexican orchestras, Mexican actors and actresses».(53) 

The OCIAA staffer did not take into account that the big North American radio companies were fascinated by the advent of television. The well-organized network set up by NBC and CBS during the war would serve as the base for the U.S. government's "La Voz de America." The influence exercised by the OCIAA on Latin American commercial radio led to a thorough transformation of the industry. As Fejes notes: Although the attempt to organize a hemispheric network based on advertising did not succeed---the networks never could make enough money on short-wave radio---, this attempt was the cause of the later implantation of the U.S. model of commercial radio in Latin America.(54) After all was said and done, the North Americans seemed wise enough to know who their competitors were. The latter-day U.S. television networks with interests in Latin America would find in Emilio Azcarraga and Televisa their best passage to the region. 

6.9 "And for our next show..." 

At the start of April, 1942, the first OCIAA-sponsored radio programs went on the air in Mexico. The three ten-minute programs had been produced in Mexico for daily broadcast by XEW, XEQ and 45 stations in the interior. The first program was "Charlas Femeninas." It was directed at women. It was thought that their support for North American ideas was "essential." In this morning program a variety of interesting stories and news items would serve to show the efforts being made by North American women in the fight for liberty. Interviews were featured with the wives of consuls and U.S. officials in Mexico. The other two programs were more information-oriented: "El noticiero de las 13:15" and "Comentario a las principales noticias del dia." The "noticiero" was completely based on information derived from the U.S. wire services. 

The annual budget for the three programs was 185,000 pesos, broken down in the following manner: Time purchases: 82,000.00 Telephone charges: 44,000.00 Publicity, personnel 59,000.00 Grant Advertising was the agency chosen to produce these programs. Besides the considerable income received from commissions, the agency had another source of revenues also derived from the U.S. government. Grant was hired to do all kinds of surveys, ratings and analyses. The bill for the first nine months of work was around 13,080 pesos.(55) Later on, at the end of 1943 and during 1944, Grant was asked to produce more programs. 

6.10 Musical programs 

To help along the production of local programming in the different countries, the OCIAA Radio Division sent a number of program guides to be used or adapted by the "Coordinating Committees." In many cases, it was simply a matter of spreading North American music as played by major orchestras. The OCIAA would distribute the appropriate records to stations. Programs of this kind in Mexico at the time included "Rapsodia Panamericana," "Delicias musicales," "Musica exquisita," "Musica de entretenamiento de las Fuerzas Armadas." Yet how was mere music to be integrated into the overall propaganda effort? What were the effects, propaganda-wise, on the Mexican public of thirty minutes of "swing" played by Glenn Miller and his orchestra? In the opinion of Herbert Cerwin, OCIAA's Director of Information in Mexico, the effects were quite minimal. As he wrote to Rockefeller in April, 1944: "Couldn't we include with our Glenn Miller pieces a little bit of history about how this style of music developed and how, because the United States is a democracy, there are opportunities for every man to improve his lot?.... It would be easy to show that the United States is becoming the cultural center of the world. The best musicians, composers and orchestras are now in the U.S. In other words, the culture of tomorrow is not in Europe but in the Americas. Unless we include messages of this kind, I do not see any advantage to transmitting these concerts except for purposes of entertainment. The propaganda in these shows does not have to be long and boring. It could be short and simple, a subtle message in each ad or at the beginning and end of the program".(56) 

6.11 "La Hora Nacional" 

The official program "La Hora Nacional" operated on a plane of its own during most of the Second World War. The show had begun on July 22, 1937, and at the start of the war it was the most important means to reach the Mexican people in a simultaneous fashion. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was not reported, for example, because "the program script had already been written and none of the writers worked on Sundays. In any event, it was not the role of 'La Hora Nacional' to be a news service."(57) 

The program emphasized music rather than information. Every once in a great while a reference would be made to the world war, but normally commentary was limited to official declarations of President Avila Camacho. Perhaps because of this situation and because of a desire for its own propaganda voice, the Mexican government created "La hora del ejercito," an official broadcast on Saturdays from 8:00 to 8:40 p.m. to be played on all the stations of the country. The format consisted of skits, music, songs, political speeches related to the war, to national unity, to the defense of the democracies, etc. In some important cities of the interior, local stations produced similar shows on behalf of their military zone. 

6.12 Mexican interpretations of the war 

During the war years, many programs were aired which attempted to explain the conflict, its causes and effects, past and future, etc., in a wide variety of formats. At times, soldiers were interviewed to narrate battlefield testimonies. This was the case with the bloody battle of Dunkirk in the summer of 1942. Armando de Maria y Campos interviewed a French captain who had suffered severely in the evacuation for the show "Por un Mundo Mejor."(58) The program was broadcast by stations XEFO and XEUZ. Other programs took the form of re-enactments with sections of dialogue and special effects. The first in this series was "La Hora de la Victoria," begun on March 17, 1942, by XEBZ. Also in this group was the series "Europa Clandestina," inaugurated by station XEFO at the start of February, 1943, along with "Los subterraneos de Checoslovaquia." The program was introduced by Dr. Spiros Makris, consul for Greece and president of the "Comite Confederado de Checoslovacos, Griegos, Polacos y Yugoslavos en Mexico."(59) 

Of all the local programming sponsored by the OCIAA in Mexico, it was the commentary-type shows which seemed most susceptible to "handling" for propaganda purposes. Announcers of the greatest prestige and credibility were paid by the U.S. government to present the correct interpretation of events in the outside world. In the middle of 1943, Manuel Bernal, the famed announcer for XEW, hosted two programs paid for by the OCIAA, "Tribuna de la Libertad" and "La Verdad es..." The first program concentrated on speeches in favor of liberty made by famous personages. It aired Sundays on XEW, XEQ , XEFO and XEDP. The second program went out six times a week on XEW. It consisted of questions and answers related to local problems caused by the hostilities. Each week's "La Verdad es..." was put on records and sent to 25 stations in the provinces. In both cases the ratings were very favorable, a fact which delighted the real sponsors.(60) 

The commentary-style program which enjoyed the most popularity in Mexico was put on by Felix F. Palavicini. In 1941, Palavicini was, at 61 years of age, a veneral figure in politics and journalism. His experience in the intrigues of propaganda dated back to the First World War when he founded and ran the daily "El Universal," the most pro-Allies publication in Mexico. Through the machinations of the then German minister in Mexico, President Carranza came to believe that Palavicini was on a U.S. payroll. Palavicini was indeed receiving subsidies and help, but he was not Carranza ended up expulsing the newspaper man from the country.(61) In the Second World War, it was no surprise to anyone that Palavicini was advocating the Allied cause once more. What might have raised some eyebrows is the fact that in this circumstance Palavicini was indeed sponsored by the U.S. government.(62) 

Among his many accomplishments, Palavicini produced the first radio news show in Mexico. It was transmitted on July 28, 1930, on station Radio-Mundial, for which he was both owner and manager.(63) Perhaps this explains how he came to chose himself to be the host of "Interpretacion Mexicana de la Guerra," first broadcast on November 16, 1942, on stations XEOY, XEB and XEBT. Palavicini justified his presence on the show with these words, "In these moments of such heart-felt interest for all of us, I felt most uncomfortable, disconcerted and nostalgic while keeping a silence which was against my very nature..."(64) The "Coordinating Committee" in Mexico sponsored Palavicini's program. It was quite similar to a previous OCIAA venture entitled "El Espectador," which had an anonymous announcer. Six months after its debut, "Interpretation Mexicana de la Guerra" was on the XEW radio chain.(65) Palavicini, like other Mexican announcers who worked for the OCIAA, would receive instructions "from time to time" from U.S. officials.(66) 

According to a letter Palavicini sent to President Avila Camacho, his listening audience with XEW exceeded "two million people, which is a sum much greater than the combined readerships of all the daily newspapers in the Republic."(67) The show was undoubtedly highly popular, certainly the most successful of the OCIAA productions. Here is how the OCIAA Director of Information in Mexico City assessed the situation: We have the extraordinary good fortune to count on Palavicini and Perez Verdia doing a similar commentary for XEB (also sponsored by the U.S.). I am sure that the two of them have bigger audiences than our ratings and polls show.(68) 

On the opening night of "Interpretacion Mexicana de la Guerra," Palavicini made the following dedication to his listening audience: «My commentaries to interpret the war will contain a minimum of doctrine and a maximum quantity of information. I have been assured of the collaboration of a great international news service, the United Press. This Mexican interpretation of the war will be the most-up-to-the minute possible, taken from the latest dispatches, almost from teletype to microphone... We are joined in a war effort which is not just between governments or nations. It is a struggle of the highest order, a battle between two forms of existence: freedom or slavery...» «Our Mexican spirit rebels against whatever form of domination. We are only interested in the triumph of those powers which promise to respect the self-determination of peoples, the sovereignty of nations, the territorial integrity of countries...» «I will speak to the people. I hope to speak for the people.» On the next day, Palavicini made clear his support for the North Americans, his secret sponsors. «No one will deny that the Japanese are good soldiers. But now that they are up against the North Americans, they are learning what it means to fight real men who are valiant, tenacious and heroic. Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callahan died on the bridge of his flagship. The North American leaders truly put their lives on the line...» That same day, November 17, 1942, he made his quota of doctrine: «The people of Mexico, like the peoples throughout our continent, are in favor of the democracies. They know that this terrible fight is being waged in defense of their liberties. Almost by instinct, without need for prolonged reflection, they know what it means to live under a representative and popular form of government rather than under repressive dictatorships...» He ended that program with a phrase which became his trademark: «Friendly listeners, the steely hands of time show that my time is up». 

6.13 Pre-packaged messages 

Just how successful were these programs? In addition to the survey results, other indicators demonstrated that the programs were thoroughly effective. From before the war's end, many Mexican commercial stations were seeking recorded versions of the North American series. The stations would offer to broadcast the shows for free. They would get the advertising to cover the costs.(69) Even after the war, many stations in Latin America continued this practice.(70) It may be said with confidence that the North American intervention in Latin American radio had a lasting impact from a technical standpoint and an economic standpoint. This intervention had a clearly stated ideological content. The Mexican listening public was treated with a pre-packaged diet of information and entertainment. The chart below shows the wide popularity of programs aired on NBC and CBS which had been sponsored by the OCIAA in Mexico City. (CHART. NOT INCLUDED HERE) 

6.14 Content strategy 

North American propagandists carefully designed and executed a strategy for the themes to be developed on radio. The strategy was divided into four major areas: a) We will win the war; b) The Axis threat to liberty; c) Relations between the countries of the Americas; and d) We will win the peace. Each objective was professionally studied and expressed in slogans and themes which were continually repeated.(71) The different themes can be picked out in all of the types of programming, but they are especially evident in the news shows. 

6.15 An analysis of news content 

"The news is an army at war. Its purpose is to fight the war, not to give information." Joseph Goebbels It has been earlier noted that the North Americans gave a good deal of importance to local programs with commentaries like Palavicini and Perez Verdia. In this fashion, the U.S. assured that news of the war arrived both pre-packaged and well-measured. The news was dressed up according to the political circumstances of the moment and the ideosyncracies of the Mexican listener. This careful supervision of the programming diet allowed for a healthy digestion of the ideological content. Yet North American propagandists were also concerned with those news shows which gave out information without the OCIAA boost. By means of an agreement with RPM the North American propagandists had been producing "Noticiero de las 13:15" since 1942. It was disseminated by the use of telephone lines to stations affiliated with XEW. Grant Advertising was the producer. Because the hours of the work day in the capital and the provinces greatly varied, simultaneous transmission was eventually judged unfeasible and overly expensive. And so, at the start of 1944, the news show was no longer sent over the phone lines by direct hook-up. The new system had the program produced by OCIAA in Mexico City to be then telegraphed to thirty stations in the interior. They would use the information at the hour best suited for their listeners.(72) 

The OCIAA also took advantage of the established news shows to fulfill its propaganda mission. From its appearance in 1930,(73) the "Noticiero Carta Blanca" was the most-listened-to news program in Mexico. It was on XEW three times each day. In March, 1944, the head of the OCIAA Radio Division in Mexico City, Herbert Cerwin, wrote to Rockefeller: ...We have made agreements with some of the most important news shows on radio so that they use our material regularly. Among these ... is the "Noticiero Carta Blanca," aired three times a day, which has a tremendous audience in Mexico City and throughout the country. ... Also signed on are the "Noticiero Bristol Meyers" of XELA, aired three times a day, and the 8:00 p.m. news show of XEW.(74) 

6.15 The most important news flash of our generation 

Every piece of news, in and of itself, is of some interest to man. One can say that human interest is drawn to news by a centrifugal force which increases in force as it has more personal relevance. When the news is coming from a war, interest increases to the measure of the casualties and death toll. For this reason, the news of the sinking of the Mexican oil freighters had an enormous social impact. At the very least, it wore off the skeptical, isolationist attitude which reigned in Mexico. The sinking of the "Potrero del Llano" on May 13, 1942, was one of the most shocking news stories in the history of Mexico. The subsequent declaration of a "state of war" between Mexico and the Axis Powers was announced by President Avila Camacho on a June 1st radio broadcast. International reactions to the move, especially by the Allies, were proof positive of Mexico's crucial position to the war effort. On June 8, 1942, Donald Francisco, director of the OCIAA Radio Division, sent a letter to the major U.S. radio stations asking for a special news bulletin on Mexico. He wrote: The most important piece of news of our generation, in relation to the good neighbors of the United States, took place on June 1st, when Mexico declared war on the Axis. For this reason, we are sending along a bulletin about Mexico which we hope will be of interest to you and to your listeners. 

The news bulletin compared the historical turning-points of the "cry of Dolores" of Hidalgo with the declaration of war of Avila Camacho, concluding with these words: «If the great patriots and liberators of the past like Hidalgo, Juarez and others could speak today, they would say to Manuel Avila Camacho, President of Mexico: Well done, friend, you have been true to the faith for which so many heroic men have fought and died in the past to make Mexico free and independent. We, the people of the United States of America, can echo those words while we salute Mexico's entry into the war as one triumphal step towards the victory of all nations which fight for liberty».(75) The BBC in London produced a tribute to the "patriotic and manly attitude of Mexico" which was re-broadcast in Mexico City on June 2nd by Radio Gobernacion in a hook-up with various local stations.(76) 

Also on the BBC, Jacques Soustelle, now a top aide to General de Gaulle, praised Mexico's decision in a broadcast to France a few days later: «Mexico has just joined the war against the Axis. For those who might be unaware of the significance of this decision, allow me to explain. This means, to begin with, the ruin of the Fifth Column in America. The Reich's plan of espionage and sabotage against the United States is mortally wounded. ... But this is not all. Mexico, which is four times the size of France, is a rich source of prime materials, especially of petroleum. Tin, tungsten, mercury, basically all the minerals necessary for making war are to be found in abundance in the Mexican soil. ... This is not to mention the air and naval bases ... as well as a small but well-trained army, ever ready to defend its territory». «We Frenchmen can never forget that Mexicans have a profound love for France and that Mexico's sympathies are with the "Free French." Every Nazi spy out of action, every drop of Mexican oil in Allied planes and have imprisoned the French people. Thank you, Mexico, and good luck, land of free and noble people, always a friend, now an ally».(77) 

Yet perhaps for most Mexicans the radio show which had the most impact was the stupendous "Saludo a Mexico" broadcast by NBC and re-broadcast by XEW on June 3rd, from 6:30 to 6:40 p.m. Here is an excerpt: 

NARRATOR: On the night of May 13th, a Mexican freighter was crossing the Atlantic Ocean...(Sounds of ship motors at work) 

SAILOR: Rodolfo! 

RODOLFO: (At a distance) Here I am, up on deck... 

SAILOR: And what are you doing? 

RODOLFO: (Listlessly) Oh, not much, just counting the stars. 

SAILOR: (Sighs) What a beautiful night! Back home, in Mexico, my father would say that to sleep on a night like this would be an insult...(Faint sounds of a guitar in the background) 

RODOLFO: I can hear Manuel over there with his guitar. 

SAILOR: It's better that he plays very softly or the captain will knock it off. 

RODOLFO: (Laughing) Yes, it's true. ... But how I like to hear it. It makes me feel that we've got a little part of Mexico on this voyage. 

SAILOR: But, isn't that so? The ship is Mexican. The cargo is Mexican oil...and Manuel's music is Mexican. (Smooth pause by the guitar) 

RODOLFO: Well, I think that I'll go below for some sleep.

 SAILOR: Don't you want to play some cards before going to sleep? 

RODOLFO: No, pal, not tonight. I think that... (Pause), Did you hear something? 

SAILOR: No. Like what? 

RODOLFO: I don't know. It sounded something like ...(Torpedo explosion) 

SAILOR: (Shouting) A torpedo! We've been torpedoed! We've been torpedoed! 

RODOLFO: (Shouting) To the boats! Hurry! Let's go! (Ship whistle blows and the sound of another explosion) 

SAILOR: The oil! It's on fire! 

RODOLFO: Get back! Watch out for the flames! 

SAILOR: (Shouting) I'm on fire! I'm on fire! (Music builds up over the cries) 

NARRATOR: (Tranquilly) Thirteen man went down with the "Potrero del Llano." Another died of wounds suffered later on in Miami. Fourteen Mexicans, young and valiant, victims of an Axis attack. They were attacked without warning. Death struck in the middle of the night and took them from us... 

VOICE #1: The war has come to Mexico.(78) 

6.16 Listen closely: this is the Radio War 

From the beginning of the Second World War, the Nazi propaganda machine understood how to make the most of radio's potential. In 1933, at the inauguration of the Berlin Radio Exposition, Goebbels declared that in the 20th century radio would play the role which newspaper enjoyed in the century before. Hitler himself had written of radio in "Mein Kampf," "It is a terrible weapon in the hands of those who know how to use it."(79) The first signs of the immense power of North American radio and its extraordinary organizational capacity appeared in 1938. The winds of war led the U.S. networks to send their top reporters to cover the story of the century, reporters who themselves came to transform radio journalism. These were the larger-than-life figures such as Katelvorn, Edward Murrow, David Shirer and Eric Sevareid, among others, who made a distant war come to life as a looming reality. One after the other, Germany, France, Poland, and England were captured by the receivers of the North American listening public, along with those Latin Americans who could tune in on short-wave. Edward Murrow's live reports during the Blitz and his high-risk trips on bomber missions are the stuff of legend.(80) 

The above excerpt about the sinking of the "Potrero del Llano" produced by North American radio is a striking example of the propaganda power in radio drama. Yet it was in the coverage of news that we find the serious, long-range effort aimed at intellectual persuasion. Transmitted by short-wave from the United States, news was delivered according to an established plan. The following examples are taken from the guidebooks used at the time. One can see the distinct rhetorical techniques that the North Americans employed on Latin America such as redundancy. This was used in its most common form, repetition. In this case, what was being hammered home was the need to accept the sufferings brought upon by the war. Here is an example: «But Mr. Rockefeller did not hide in his speech one important fact, which is, that before the Americas can take full advantage of the amazing benefits derived from cooperation, they have to pass through a difficult period of sacrifices and hardships on behalf of the common good. Yes. A difficult period of sacrifices and hardships. Only nations which are united by the strongest bonds of affection and understanding are willing to endure such a difficult period of sacrifices and hardships. Listen to the answer which Mr. Rockefeller gave to these questions, an answer which ought to warm the hearts of all our listening audience: He said, 'The 21 American republics are totally aware of the sacrifice which this war involves. They accept this sacrifice without complaint, with the conviction that these hardships are the price of liberty in a world where fascism is on the prowl».(81) 

Religion was recognized as a vital force in the Mexican people, the root of its deepest sentiments. And so, it was worked into the news delivery: «The U.S. Ambassador in Mexico, George S. Messersmith, has just revealed the details of a Nazi plan to undermine religion in all of its manifestations. I have here what he said... in a speech before the International Federation of Women in Mexico: "We Christians do not seem to realize that these monsters want to impose a pagan religion on the world. They are completely dedicated to the destruction of the Christian faith, to strip it out of the human heart. As parents and Christians we all hate war, but there are some things which are more important than our hatred of war. One of these things is the love which protects our children and our determination that the Christian faith survive".» «Moral values determine the value of things, but when moral values are attacked by an implacable monster, we cannot remain idle and invite destruction. Our faith alone will not save us. If we count only on our faith....as a defender of the rights of reason, the monster will craftily laugh in our face. Our faith alone will not save us...»(82) 

This was how the Nazis and Japanese were depicted as destroyers of ancient cultures and values: «The richest art collection in the world is presently the private property of most hard-hearted vandals on Earth. The number one vandal on Earth is, of course, Marshall Goering. The air forces under the Marshall's control have bombarded all kinds of artistic treasures with abandon... His pilots have deliberately chosen to bomb museums, art galleries, monuments and cathedrals... They have destroyed simply for the pleasure of destroying, erasing the most important symbols of a civilization which they want to eliminate. ... Who would have thought that the author of these crimes ... passes himself for a lover of fine art? He has been sacking European art galleries, taking for his own whatever treasures haven't been ruined by the Nazi fury». «Naturally, Goering would love ... to sack the cathedrals and museums of Latin America, just as he has sacked those of Europe. ...He would love to do in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Bogota and Mexico City the same work which he has done in Paris, The Hague, Belgrade and Prague. ... Avarice has no limits. The wild cravings of the Nazi adventurers have no limit either. They are desperately intent on invading the Western Hemisphere. This is why the nations of the Americas must stay united ... to throw off the invaders when they attack».(83) 

The Japanese would also get theirs: «Neither the Japanese nor the Nazis seem capable of understanding that culture, valor, faith, hope and noble love for liberty can be found outside of books. These great virtues are shared by all those who oppose the Axis threat. ...They are always present in the conscience, the heart and the soul of those persons who abhor with all their might tyranny and oppression...» «Remember that the Nazis threw into thje fire every book which had anything critical to say about Germany. From burning books they hope to somehow destroy forces which are much more powerful than tanks, planes and cannons ...» (84) 

The guidebook for the news shows aimed at Latin America had a section entitled "mutual appreciation," through which aspects of regional art, culture and social life were highlighted and praised. Since the show came from the United States, the praise had a special meaning for the lucky country. Mexico was featured on several occasions: «Mexico and the United States are putting all their energies together to manufacture the best, lightweight machine-gun ever known. This machine-gun, known as "Mendoza," is a moveable weapon which bears the name of its inventor, the Mexican Juan Mendoza. ...It is reported that a large factory will soon be set up in the U.S. to build this formidable weapon.»(85) 

On other occasions, the news would focus on the valor and war-preparedness of the Latin American countries. As if the irrational Mexican machismo were not sufficient to heat up the environment, news bulletins would arrive like this one: «Mexico is not playing in this war. That's what the prestigious magazine "Newsweek" has stated in its analysis of Mexico's state of preparedness. ...and its plans to greatly expand the actual army...» (86) «The North American public are clearly very impressed by the actions taken by the Mexican government, as shown by recent editorials. ... According to the "Time Union": 'Both the government and the Mexican people are united with us in our fight against the Axis Powers.' The "Advertiser" of Montgomery, Alabama, says this: 'With the entry of Mexico in the war, the Axis nationals can be kept under control, keeping them from all kinds of intrigue and conspiracy. ...With Mexico at our side, the Fascist and Nazi agents are deprived of a base of operations to spread their venom and promote sabotage.'» (87) 

(*) José Luis Ortiz Garza. Lecturer and researcher at Universidad Panamericana (Mexico, City). He has also published «La guerra de las ondas» (a full version of this chapter on radio warfare in Mexico during the WW2), and «Una radio entre dos reinos» (the story of John R. Brinkley and his border radio station in Acuna, Coahuila, Mexico: 1931-1941). 

Dr. José Luis Ortiz Garza Augusto Rodín 475, Col. Mixcoac México D.F., C.P. 03920 email: jlo@rodin.org.mx

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